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Abstract
Recent philosophy of science has witnessed a shift in focus, in that significantly
more consideration is given to how scientists employ models. Attending to the role
of models in scientific practice leads to new questions about the representational roles
of models, the purpose of idealizations, why multiple models are used for the same
phenomenon, and many more besides. In this paper, I suggest that these themes
resonate with central topics in feminist epistemology, in particular prominent versions
of feminist empiricism, and that model-based science and feminist epistemology each
has crucial resources to offer the other’s project.
1 Introduction
This paper has two aims, for two audiences. For those who examine how social values
find their way into the products of science, I aim to show that the features of what has
been termed model-based science are central to that project. For those who attend to the
role of models in scientific practice, I aim to show that themes of feminist epistemology—
particularly the views labeled feminist empiricism—provide necessary parts of a full picture
of model-based science. Scientific models and the role of social values both are themes in
recent philosophy of science, but these topics have largely been treated independently. Much
stands to be gained from developing views on these topics in tandem.
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The potential for expansion can be illustrated by a current debate in evolutionary biology
about sexual selection theory. At its most basic, sexual selection theory posits competition
among members of the same sex (and the same species) for mating opportunities with
members of the opposite sex, and it is associated with a variety of further hypotheses
surrounding the evolution of sex and sex-linked traits. Roughgarden (2009) criticizes sexual
selection theory on a variety of grounds, and she suggests what she terms “social selection
theory” as an alternative. Roughgarden posits that the traits that sexual selection theory is
supposed to explain are better understood as adaptations to a range of social interactions,
including mating, but also including offspring-rearing, coalition-building, etc., and that these
interactions often lead to cooperative outcomes.1
Elements of this debate suggest that what is at issue is the choice among competing
modeling approaches. Sexual selection theorists advocate extending and revising the
traditional sexual selection framework to accommodate scenarios that do not appear to
conform to it (e.g. Clutton-Brock, 2009). Roughgarden instead proposes that a wholly
different modeling approach better represents the evolution of sex and reproduction. At
issue is a disagreement over whether sexual and reproductive traits generally conform to
a pattern of cooperation or conflict. On this interpretation, sexual selection theory and
Roughgarden’s alternative social selection theory are proposed modeling approaches with
similar ranges of target phenomena and different representations of the targets’ key features.
This is an ongoing episode of science, so the resolution is not yet known. Notice, though,
that both sexual selection theory and social selection theory may be accurate to some degree,
with each representing certain features of the evolution of sex and reproduction. Indeed,
Roughgarden allows that some traits are best described in terms of competition, and sexual
selection theorists grant that not all mating behavior matches the classic sexual selection
scenario (Clutton-Brock, 2007).
1See (Milam et al., 2011) for an analysis of Roughgarden’s project.
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Yet this construal omits an important element of the debate, which comes to light when
one considers why Roughgarden places such emphasis on cooperation. Roughgarden is clear
on this point: she values cooperation and regard for others, which inspires her to reexamine
evolutionary phenomena presumed to be explained by sexual conflict (Roughgarden, 2009;
Roughgarden, in conversation). Social values are thus explicitly invoked in this debate.
Each side accuses the other of imposing a favored worldview by privileging cooperation or
conflict (Coyne, 2004; Roughgarden, 2009). However, as I pointed out above, it may be
that sexual selection theory and Roughgarden’s social selection theory are both successful
modeling strategies. There is a puzzle, then, in how to account for the role of social values
in this episode of science, since they do not lead to directly opposed empirical claims.
Near the end of this paper, I suggest an interpretation of the sexual selection/social
selection debate that integrates both of these elements. That interpretation serves to
illustrate the implications of model-based science for feminist epistemology, and vice versa.
To get there, I first develop parallels between philosophical treatments of model-based science
and a prominent approach to feminist epistemology of science (Section 2). These parallels
provide mutual support for some of the considerations of feminist epistemology and scientific
modeling; they also offer promising interpretations of some projects of feminist epistemology,
and valuable extensions of accounts of model-based science. Then, in Section 3, I use insights
from model-based science to help motivate the expansion of feminism into non-epistemic
elements of philosophy of science, including model-construction, idealization, the selection
of causal variables, and scientific explanation.2 Indeed, the expansion is bidirectional, for
feminist philosophy of science is well-situated to provide conceptual resources for model-
based science as well.
2The term “epistemic” has multiple meanings in philosophy of science. Throughout this paper I employ
the term simply to refer to the aspects of science related to the search for truth, viz., related to scientific
epistemology. Hence I label “non-epistemic” all other aspects of science. The term is alternatively used to
distinguish among types of influences on science, i.e. the properly epistemic from the social/non-epistemic;
I do not use that terminology nor that distinction here.
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2 Approaches to Pluralism: Models and Feminism
2.1 Model-Based Science
Over the past several decades, models have received increasing attention in philosophy of
science. However, coverage is somewhat fractured among distinct literatures, and the term
“model” has been used in different ways for different projects. Models initially rose in
prominence with the emergence of the semantic theory of science (Suppe, 1977), and in van
Fraassen’s (1980) formulation of constructive empiricism.3 In both uses, models were taken to
be mathematical structures that serve as interpretations of scientific theories—viz., models in
the logicians’ sense. Giere (1988) took a somewhat different view of models, starting from the
overt idealizations prominent in science textbooks—frictionless pendulums, bodies subject
to no external forces, etc. Giere too notes the overlap with the terminology of logicians, for
whom a model is an object satisfying some set of axioms. Nonetheless he is critical of van
Fraassen’s idea that models should be isomorphic to real-world systems, suggesting instead
that the important relationship between models and reality is one of similarity.
Giere’s (1988) view of the role of models in science inspired another literature on scientific
modeling, one that is prominent in current philosophy of science.4 This tradition emphasizes
models’ incorporation of abstractions and idealizations, and thus only partial representation
of real-world systems. Early inspiration for this approach was also drawn from Levins (1966),
who addresses population biology in particular, as well as Wimsatt (1987). Emphasis is
placed on accounting for the role of models in actual scientific practice, including how models
can be employed independently of theory or without the aim of immediately representing
a real-world system. A focus on modeling brings to the fore non-epistemic questions about
3Though see also (Hesse, 1966) for an early account of models in science.
4Note, however, that models are also still discussed in connection with the semantic view (da Costa &
French, 2000) and undoubtedly in other literatures as well. Godfrey-Smith (2006) discusses the differences
between these treatments.
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science (Giere, 1988), including the nature of representation, the purpose of idealization, the
explanatory roles of models, and others.
In this paper, my focus is model-based science: a distinctive approach to doing science
that is based on the construction and analysis of models (Godfrey-Smith, 2006; Weisberg,
2007b). Giere (1988) points out that observations of science as it is practiced shows that
models occupy center stage. Indeed, most philosophical treatments of model-based science
are committed to reflecting actual scientific practice. For example, both Levins (1993) and
Odenbaugh (2003) appeal to the accurate representation of scientific practice as part of
their defense of the existence of tradeoffs among modeling approaches (both in response to
Orzack & Sober (1993)). Additionally, though (Giere, 1988) addresses physics, the discussion
of model-based science has largely focused on biology (e.g. Beatty, 1980a,b; Plutynski, 2000,
in addition to Levins, 1966; Orzack & Sober, 1993; Levins, 1993; Odenbaugh, 2003).
The prominent aspects of model-based science addressed by philosophers stem from a
focus on representation—roughly, the similarity relation that Giere (1988) posits between
a model and a real-world system. Godfrey-Smith (2006) and Weisberg (2007b) contrast
direct and indirect representation. In what Weisberg terms abstract direct representation,
the aim is simply to describe an actual system in order to investigate it directly. In contrast,
the aim of modeling is to indirectly represent a real-world system by describing a simpler,
hypothetical system and investigating that simpler system, in order to draw conclusions
about the actual system of interest. Broadly, scientific models are treated as a kind of
intermediary—between investigations and the world in their role as indirect representations,
and between explanations and the world insofar as they are used to generate understanding
(Cartwright, 1983; Woodward, 2003).
In virtue of the strategy of indirect representation, models often represent their target
systems only partially. They bear some features in common, while others are neglected
or falsified. This is accomplished via the use of abstractions—the neglect of some
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features—or idealizations—incorporating unrealistic features (Wimsatt, 1987; Weisberg,
2007a; Batterman, 2009). It is thus common to employ a variety of models, with different
combinations of simplifying assumptions, and to use comparisons to help distinguish central
features of the models from artifacts of the idealizations. This is called robustness analysis
(Levins, 1966; Wimsatt, 1981; Weisberg, 2006b). There is also the question of whether
different desiderata, such as generality and accuracy, call for the development of different
types of models—i.e., whether there are tradeoffs among the aims of models (Orzack & Sober,
1993; Levins, 1993; Odenbaugh, 2003; Matthewson & Weisberg, 2009). In what follows, I
explore how these and related features of model-based science resonate in valuable ways with
feminist approaches to philosophy of science.
2.2 Parallels with Feminist Empiricism
The past several decades have witnessed a variety of feminist concerns about and approaches
to epistemology and science. A range of very different views all go by the name of feminist
epistemology or philosophy of science.5 Two types of views are particularly relevant to the
current project: feminist empiricism and standpoint epistemology. Early versions of feminist
empiricism offered the most conservative feminist approach to science. Their aim was to
show how sexism and other social biases have permeated science and to appeal to traditional
scientific norms of objectivity and empiricism to correct such biases. A stronger alternative
is standpoint epistemology, according to which women and others traditionally occupying
disadvantaged social roles may gain epistemic privilege by reflecting on their subjugation.
This is a less conservative position, for it introduces considerations that warrant revisiting
traditional scientific norms. Several more recent feminist epistemologies have moved toward
5The terms “feminist epistemology” and “feminist philosophy of science” are largely used interchangeably
(e.g. Anderson, 2010). The question of how we know becomes, for science, the questions of what counts as
evidence, and what the relationship is between theory and evidence. These are the primary concern of
feminist theories of science.
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a middle ground between the classic versions of feminist empiricism and standpoint theory
(Intemann, 2010), including the recent articulations of feminist empiricism on which I will
focus in this paper.
Longino (1990, 2001) and Nelson (1990) have developed influential versions of feminist
empiricism. Whereas it has often been assumed that social influences can only undermine
scientific objectivity, thereby resulting in bad science, Longino and Nelson attempt to
reconcile the ubiquity of social and cultural influences on science with the achievement
of objectivity. Central both to Longino’s and Nelson’s accounts is the role played by
communities in science. According to Nelson, communities are in fact the “knowers”—
the entities that acquire knowledge. Social values shape community practices, so values in
turn find their way into scientific practice. This can occur as influence on what studies are
undertaken, in judgments of theories’ prima facie plausibility, in what standards of evidence
are accepted, and in how underdetermination among competing theories is resolved. Longino
(2001) investigates how social values influence the range of assumptions that mediate the
relationship between hypotheses and data. In Longino’s view, it is those assumptions, and
the related research goals, that actually define a scientific community.
Yet there is a difference between how Longino and Nelson envision the role of community
in science. Both stress that the influence of social values on science is subject to critical
scrutiny, but they differ on how that critical scrutiny plays out. Longino’s pluralism
arises from her commitment to “local epistemologies.” This is the idea that many distinct
communities exist within science, each governed by their own epistemic commitments, arising
from their own background assumptions and goals. Some epistemic standards, such as
empirical adequacy, transcend individual subcommunities, enabling each subcommunity’s
theories and methods to be subject to external criticism. Yet, because subcommunities differ
in other epistemic commitments, there persists a plurality of theories and methods. These
epistemic subcommunities thus embody the limits of empirical determination. In contrast,
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Nelson emphasizes the contiguity of the scientific community with the broader community;
for her, the community of science is in fact the solution to the limits of empiricism.
Other features of Longino’s and Nelson’s accounts will emerge later in this discussion.
For both, their versions of feminist empiricism at once adhere to the norm of evidence-
driven science and yet authorize a role for social values in science. The resulting view
resonates in interesting ways with the account of model-based science surveyed in Section 2.1.
Moreover, feminist empiricism and model-based science are well-positioned to offer support
and theoretical advancement for each others’ purposes, in virtue of their connections and
parallels.
Like the literature on scientific modeling, feminist epistemology has focused largely
on biology and the social sciences (e.g. Harding & Hintikka, 1983, Fox Keller, 1983).
Additionally, as both Longino and Nelson stress, the goal of feminist epistemology is to
attend to science as it is actually practiced, instead of merely considering a disembodied set
of theories. These two similarities with treatments of model-based science are superficial,
but they are not insignificant. Focusing on actual scientific practice, as it plays out in a
variety of fields of sciences, leads away from a monolithic, “rational reconstruction” view of
science, and toward views that can accommodate a variety of scientific approaches and goals.
This is consistent with the aims of feminist epistemology and the aims of the literature on
model-based science.
Feminist epistemology and accounts of model-based science also employ somewhat
parallel approaches to making sense of this variety of scientific approaches and goals. The
recognition that model-based science requires simplifying idealizations is similar to feminist
discussions of “framework assumptions,” such as representing humans as self-interested
rational agents (Longino, 1990; Anderson, 2010). Feminist epistemologists see this as one
aspect of science that is influenced by social values. Another perceived role for social values
is as an influence on the “epistemic virtues” of scientific theories, and how these virtues
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are weighted (Longino, 2001). Widely endorsed epistemic values such as the simplicity,
generality, and even the empirical adequacy of theories are, according to Longino, actually
special to particular scientific communities. A scientific community selects the epistemic
virtues to which it subscribes, and this choice is influenced by the aims and values the
group has inherited. Longino points out that even empirical adequacy is negotiable, for
one may choose to sacrifice some precision or accuracy to satisfy an alternate epistemic
virtue (185, 186). This last point is strongly reminiscent of the literature on tradeoffs in
model-based science. The idea of tradeoffs is inspired by Levins’ (1966) view that models in
population biology cannot be at once maximally accurate, precise, and general. This point
has been used to motivate the idea that some models should sacrifice a degree of precision
to purchase greater realism and generality, which enables them to represent a broader range
of similar systems (Weisberg, 2006a). Treatments of model-based science thus share with
feminist philosophy of science the recognition that simplifying assumptions are rampant
and ineliminable from science, and the related idea that some precision or realism may be
sacrificed to further other scientific goals.
This parallel also provides an opportunity for feminist philosophy of science to motivate
an extension of accounts of model-based science. Tradeoffs among modeling desiderata is a
plausible framework for interpreting Longino’s view that commitments to epistemic virtues
differ among sub-communities of science, at least in part because of divergent social values.
Weisberg (2006a) focuses on the choice to sacrifice some precision in order to increase the
generality of a model, on the grounds that this results in models that are well-suited to
serve as explanations. Yet this is but one possible type of tradeoff. Another is, for instance,
the choice to sacrifice some generality in order to increase the realistic representation of
complex, highly variable interactions.6 This can be seen as a preference for complexity over
6Generality is here understood as Weisberg’s p-generality (2006a), viz., in terms of range of applicability
to possible systems. I take this form of generality to be equivalent to the abstractness of a model; see
(Potochnik, 2010b) for elaboration on this point.
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simplicity, one of the non-traditional epistemic virtues Longino discusses. Other things equal,
a more abstract model will have fewer parameters: it will be simpler and, in virtue of lower
expectations of fidelity, applicable to a broader range of systems. Additional parameters
enable a more realistic, higher fidelity representation of a complex system, but this also will
decrease the model’s generality. Which approach should be pursued depends on the modeler’s
aims and can be influenced by weighing commitments to simplicity versus attending to
complex interactions, i.e., two of the conflicting epistemic virtues Longino describes. This is
an extension of the account of tradeoffs central to model-based science, but in my view, a
highly plausible extension.7
Model-based science is also well-situated to provide a plausible interpretation of Longino’s
claim that adherence to different epistemic virtues provide “different knowledge” about
a single phenomenon (Longino, 2001, p.189).8 Modeling, in contrast to abstract direct
representation, leads to the deemphasis of complete accuracy, and accordingly, of truth.
According to Giere (1988),
That theoretical hypotheses can be true or false turns out to be of little
consequence. To claim a hypothesis is true is to claim no more or less than
that an indicated type and degree of similarity exists between a model and a
real system. We can therefore forget about truth and focus on the details of the
similarity (81).
With this shift, it is easy to imagine how commitments to different epistemic virtues
could lead to “different knowledge,” as Longino phrases it. Different models will represent
different features of a system, at different degrees of abstraction; they will employ different
idealizations; and they will generalize to different ranges of other systems. On this
7Further support for this extension is provided by the discussion in Section 3 of social values’ influence
on explanatory practice. Insofar as tradeoffs are made to facilitate explanation, attending to different causal
patterns in pursuit of explanation will lead to different types of tradeoffs.
8Indeed, Longino (2000) discusses how a focus on scientific modeling increases the plausibility of this idea.
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interpretation, a commitment to the idea that different values generate different scientific
knowledge about a single phenomenon does not involve granting the truth of multiple claims
that are mutually inconsistent. Instead, it amounts to the much less problematic idea that
multiple models provide different representations of the target system.
This interpretation of Longino’s view makes clear that both feminist science and model-
based science are committed to the persistence of multiple approaches. Longino (2001) says,
“local epistemologies enable us to think of situations characterized by a plurality of theories
and models in a pluralist framework, rather than as a sign of the immaturity of a given field
of research” (188). On this view, Kuhn (1962) was wrong to see a plurality of approaches as
a sign that a field has not yet reached normalcy; it is instead a permanent feature of science.
Model-based science embodies this pluralism. Multiple modeling approaches persist because
they satisfy different representational aims; accomplish different tradeoffs among opposed
virtues like generality, accuracy, and precision; and allow for comparisons among models
with different assumptions, such as occurs with robustness analysis. This echos feminist
empiricists’ analysis of how social values influence the production of science: in the choice of
causal variables to focus upon (Longino, 1990), in what epistemic virtues are adopted, and
in how they are weighted (Longino, 2001), all of which open to both internal and external
critique. It also offers an interpretation of the epistemic interdependence that Nelson (1990)
emphasizes.9
With this pluralism also comes a shared emphasis on situated, or perspectival, knowers
and knowledge (cf. van Fraassen, 2008). This helps to motivate feminist epistemologists’
emphasis on first-person and embodied knowledge, and the importance of science performed
by individuals with a range of cognitive styles (Anderson, 2010). Social epistemology is thus
a natural bedfellow of model-based science. Wimsatt (1987) sums up why this would be;
9A case study of epistemic interdependence for models of evolution by natural selection is detailed in
(Potochnik, 2010a).
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he says, “any model must make some assumptions and simplifications, many of which are
problematic, so the best working hypothesis would be that there are no bias free models in
science” (24). Feminist epistemology can provide the resources to manage this rampant bias
accompanying model-based science. On the accounts of feminist empiricism considered here,
problematic simplifications and assumptions are controlled for by the development of models
with contrary simplifications and assumptions. The differently biased models developed by
differently situated scientists maintain a pluralistic science, but they also provide a route to
(community) knowledge and objectivity.
In turn, accounts of model-based science offer a way to conceptualize the mediation
of disagreements among different local epistemologies. By deemphasizing truth in favor
of similarity relations, models distance themselves from absolute epistemic commitments. If
researchers are aware of the simplifying assumptions they make, this leads to an appreciation
of the limited representational roles of their models, which facilitates openness to other
modeling approaches. This enables a sort of detachment from absolute claims about real-
world dynamics. Godfrey-Smith (2006) suggests that,
When much day-to-day discussion is about model systems, disagreement about
the nature of a target system is less able to impede communication. The model
acts as a buffer, enabling communication and cooperative work across scientists
who have different commitments about the target system (739).
This is how, for example, biologists can usefully discuss the dynamics of a game theory
model of animal behavior, though they disagree on the significance of the model for actual
evolutionary history. Thus, model-based science can facilitate communication and mediate
disagreements in a pluralistic scientific community by distancing modeling approaches from
truth-claims. This allows alternate approaches to be acknowledged and models to be
fruitfully discussed, even in the face of disagreements about their applications.
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I have suggested several parallels and mutual supports between feminist empiricism
and model-based science; these are summarized in Table 1. The parallels begin with
a shared focus on actual scientific practice as it plays out in a variety of fields. This
leads to an appreciation for the variety of approaches employed, and how each offers, at
best, partially successful representation instead of total accuracy. Simplifying idealizations,
also termed framework assumptions, are inescapable. Multiple modeling approaches, with
different representational aims, thus can simultaneously flourish, for each provides different
perspectival knowledge. Here feminist empiricism has something to offer accounts of model-
based science. Feminist empiricism’s conception of the commitments scientific communities
have to different epistemic virtues provides a reason to expect divergences in modeling aims,
what aspects of a target system are focused upon, and what similar systems inform the
inquiry. All lead to different tradeoffs among modeling desiderata. Moreover, feminist
epistemologists emphasize that these are all avenues for social values to exert influence
on science. Yet pluralism in science simultaneously exerts a corrective influence on biases,
and here accounts of model-based science supplement feminist analyses. A multiplicity of
modeling approaches makes room for models with opposed assumptions and idealizations.
These are helpful in demonstrating how conclusions depend upon specific, problematic
assumptions, and which conclusions are robust across a range of assumptions. Finally, this
pluralism allows disagreements about ultimate truths of the world to persist, even as there
is agreement on the partial success of a variety of models.
3 Beyond Feminist Epistemology
There is something of a mismatch that accompanies the parallels I outlined above
between feminist empiricism and model-based science. Though each resonates with—and
can offer conceptual resources to—the other, feminist empiricism is a view about the
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model-based science feminist empiricism
simplifying idealizations framework assumptions
modeling tradeoffs weighing of epistemic virtues
different representational aims different knowledge
multiple modeling approaches variety of local epistemologies
multiple models with competing
assumptions
importance of a range of cognitive
styles
agreement about models; disagree-
ment about target systems
communication among divergent
scientific communities
Table 1: Parallels between accounts of model-based science and feminist empiricism
epistemology of science, whereas model-based science draws attention toward a variety of
non-epistemic features of scientific practice. This does not undermine the connection between
feminist epistemology and the philosophical literature on modeling. Instead it provides an
opportunity for the expansion of the role of feminism in philosophy of science.
The core idea of feminist empiricism is that social values play a proper role in the
production of scientific knowledge. The natural first step of such a program is to demonstrate
how social values influence not just what questions are investigated, but also what answers
are found: hence a feminist epistemology (or epistemologies). But a similar question about
the role of social values can be asked about other aspects of scientific practice. Attending
to model-based science brings to light a range of non-epistemic aspects of science that are
plausibly influenced by social values, in a manner consistent with but not exhausted by
feminist epistemology.
The elements of model-based science discussed in Section 2.1 serve as an entry point
into a range of possibilities. The indirect representation that models provide makes explicit
that researchers choose which features of a real-world system to represent, and which to
misrepresent with idealizations. This choice is plausibly guided by background concerns
that include social values, whether consciously or not. This is akin to discussion in feminist
philosophy of science of how social values can influence the choice of causal variables
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(Longino, 1990, 2001). Framing this as a choice about representation, a feature of models,
makes clear that the issue is distinct from that of what causal factors are posited to exist.
There is a corresponding choice to make regarding not only what features to idealize, but
also the nature of simplifying assumptions to employ in their stead. This too is a place
where social values can exert an influence distinct from their epistemic influence. A third,
related opportunity for the influence of social values on model-based science arises with
robustness analysis. Recall from above that robustness analysis is the comparison of models
with different idealizations in order to distinguish important features of the models from
artifacts. The choice of how to vary simplifying assumptions, and even what features to test
for robustness, may bear the mark of social values.
Consider, for instance, the choice to represent human genes as comprising a single human
genome, as was done in the Human Genome Project, or as distinct male and female genomes,
as some advocated when the X chromosome was sequenced (Richardson, 2010). Richardson
emphasizes that this is not an empirical question, but is instead a feature of model-choice.
Both involve simplifying idealizations. Representing the human genome as unitary neglects
a range of systematic differences among individuals, including between males and females,
whereas the representation of distinct male and female genomes treats differences between
sexes as analogous to differences between species. The different idealizations have non-trivial
implications for genomic models. As Richardson demonstrates, this feature of modeling is
plausibly influenced by social values, such as the desire to emphasize human diversity or
human commonality, or to avert gender essentialism.
Scientific explanation is another non-epistemic aspect of science into which model-based
science can offer inroads for feminist analysis. Explicit discussion of explanation is present in
some feminist approaches to science, including in both Longino’s and Nelson’s accounts. Yet
missing from those discussions is a treatment of explanation that is independent of scientific
epistemology and theory confirmation. Different questions arise for scientific explanations
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than those surrounding the corroboration of hypotheses and theories, and the attributes
of good explanations may differ from the attributes of well-corroborated theories. For
instance, Sober (2003) argues that unification can be a valid criterion for judging the truth
of a theory, but not for judging explanatory worth. More broadly, I argue elsewhere that
formulating explanations and confirming theories play very different roles in science and,
accordingly, motivate different, even opposed, practices (Potochnik, 2010a). Thus, I suggest
that a full-fledged feminist approach to scientific explanation will be independent of feminist
epistemology. Explaining via models enables a move in that direction.
Many have asserted a role for models in scientific explanations (e.g. Achinstein, 1965;
Cartwright, 1983; Woodward, 2003; Batterman, 2009; Strevens, 2009; Bokulich, 2011). Here
I will proceed under the assumption that this general view is right—that models at least
sometimes serve as explanations. Because models only partially represent target systems,
a model that explains does so in spite of lapses in the accuracy of its representation.
This suggests that, as different models of a system vary in what they represent and
what idealizations they employ, so too may explanations of the same event vary in what
information they convey. Perhaps these varying explanations are appropriate for different
aims, just as different models are appropriate for different aims. Granting models a role in
explanation thus introduces the possibility of pluralism about explanation as well.10
By explanatory pluralism, I mean that, at least sometimes, the best explanation of a
given event depends on additional factors, factors that vary. The possibility of explanatory
pluralism ushered in by the view that models play a role in explanation creates another
space for the influence of social values. Elsewhere I have argued that scientific explanations
depend essentially on the context in which they are formulated (Potochnik, 2010a,b). The
idea is that different causal patterns deserve explanatory focus, depending on the nature
10Here I have merely sketched one way in which model-based science may be used to (in part) motivate
explanatory pluralism. This is not the only option; Strevens (2009), for instance, develops an account of
explanation that assumes models explain, but is not pluralist in this way.
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of the research program for which the explanation is formulated. This does not mean that
scientists make up whatever explanations they fancy, citing whatever causal factors interest
them. Instead, explanations emerge from the interplay of corroborated causal claims and
interest-driven choices about which of those causal claims are explanatory, and how they are
to be represented in a model. It is this element of choice that enables social values to exert
special influence on scientific explanations.
For an example, consider again the debate in evolutionary biology about sexual selection
theory introduced at the beginning of this paper. Recall that sexual selection theory posits
competition among members of the same sex for mating opportunities to account for a variety
of sexual and reproductive traits, and Roughgarden (2009) criticizes these hypotheses and
suggests what she calls “social selection theory” as an alternative. Roughgarden argues
that the traits that sexual selection theory is supposed to explain are better explained as
adaptations to a much broader range of social interactions, interactions that often lead to
cooperative outcomes. As different accounts of the evolution of sex and reproduction, sexual
selection theory and social selection theory may seem to offer contradictory explanations of
animal behavior, but that is not quite right. As I pointed out above, each theory may apply
to some evolutionary phenomena, as both sides acknowledge (Roughgarden, 2009; Clutton-
Brock, 2007). Sexual selection models and social selection models may even predict some
of the same behavioral outcomes. Thus sexual selection explanations and social selection
explanations need not be incompatible. Nonetheless, they differ in the role ascribed to
sexual conflict or to mutual gain through cooperation, and this difference shows itself in the
types of causal patterns the two emphasize. If patterns of sexual conflict and cooperation are
both embodied in some range of behaviors, then both the sexual selection explanation and
the social selection explanation may be successful. These two contextual explanations simply
latch onto different causal patterns to which the scenario conforms. Contextual explanation
makes possible the success of both explanations, but that success is relative to a background
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research agenda.
This version of explanatory pluralism provides a framework for understanding how social
values influence scientific explanations: different social values can result in a focus on different
causal patterns. Consequently, different systems of values can yield different proposed
explanations—explanations that latch onto different causal patterns and that are formulated
in the context of different research programs. This is one element of the debate over sexual
selection theory versus social selection theory. Roughgarden and some sexual selection
theorists accuse each other of imposing a favored worldview by privileging cooperation or
sexual conflict, respectively (Coyne, 2004; Roughgarden, 2009). Part of their disagreement
is over whether sexual and reproductive traits generally embody a pattern of cooperation or
conflict. It may be that one of these patterns is entirely absent. On the other hand, both
may be accurate to some degree, and hence explain some traits (in some contexts).
Thus, in my view, a feminist approach to explanation should acknowledge the context-
dependence of explanations and investigate how social values shape the contexts. For reasons
mentioned above, this role of social values should be distinguished from their epistemic role.
Existing feminist analyses are evocative of the directions in which such an analysis would
proceed, but there is room for expansion. To begin with, one may investigate the ways
in which social values contribute to the production of multiple distinct explanations of a
single phenomenon, how those are related to their respective contexts, and how this curtails
comparisons of the worth of different explanations.
In this section, I have focused on how model-based science can be used to motivate the
expansion of feminism into non-epistemic elements of scientific practice. Recall, though, that
I intend a two-way expansion, for as shown in Section 2.2, feminist philosophy of science
is also well-situated to provide conceptual resources for accounts of model-based science.
Feminist empiricism attends to the influence of scientific communities, alternative epistemic
virtues like the realistic representation of complex processes, the perspectival nature of
18
knowledge, and how social values can play a legitimate role in science. These aspects
of science all shape how model-building actually proceeds, so accounts of these features
supplement accounts of model-based science. We have seen, for instance, how disagreements
over sexual selection models and social selection models are influenced by different views
about, as Roughgarden puts it, what is “basic to biological nature” (2009, 3), prime territory
for the influence of social values. And in Section 2.2, it was shown how commitments to
divergent epistemic virtues, also influenced by social values, can motivate different modeling
strategies, with different tradeoffs. The insights of feminist empiricism thus help motivate the
sort of pluralism that results from model-based science. Finally, feminist critiques of science
help motivate the explicit use of models—and thus explicit acknowledgement of limitations
and falsifications—over attempted or presumed direct representation of the world. Model-
based science and socially engaged science go hand in hand nicely.
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